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This paper, first, empirically investigates European emission allowance (EUA) prices and, 
second, evaluates emission trading as a policy measure. Applying combined jump GARCH 
models yields strong evidence of conditional jump behavior. This implies that EUA prices are 
subject to unexpected movements and that a considerable degree of uncertainty is present. 
According to the real option literature, uncertainty has adverse effects on investment 
decisions. Thus, investments in abatement technologies are likely to be postponed due to the 
peculiar characteristics of emission allowance prices. Furthermore, this price behavior is at 
odds with the theoretical notion that emission prices equal marginal abatement costs. 
JEL Code: C22, Q50. 
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June 2009 1 Introduction
This paper's contribution to the literature is twofold. First, it empirically an-
alyzes European emission certi¯cate prices (EUA), using Chan and Maheu's
(2002) auto-regressive jump-intensity (ARJI)-GARCH model. Second, the
real options perspective allows to evaluate the empirical results on certi¯cate
prices and derive conclusions on emission trading as a policy tool.
Empirically analyzing emission allowance (EUA) prices receives growing at-
tention in the literature. Several papers study the behavior of carbon prices
and the development of the European carbon market. Most relevant results
for this paper are from Daskalakis et al. (2009) who argue that the EUA
future is characterized by jumps. Moreover, Paolella and Taschini (2008) as
well as Benz and TrÄ uck (2009) ¯nd GARCH structure in the carbon price
returns. However, jumps and conditional heteroscedasticity has not yet been
treated in a single approach as brought forward in this paper. A combined ap-
proach is motivated by the particular strong in°uence of regulatory changes
in carbon markets, such as decisions on the absolute supply, the allocation to
di®erent sectors or the manner of distribution. This particularity of carbon
markets has been emphasized in a few recent papers, such as Yang et al.
(2008) and Tuthill (2008). They conclude that regulatory decisions lead to
jumps in the price data. In order to incorporate such discrete events, the
empirical model allows for jumps as well as GARCH e®ects. Strong evidence
of conditional jumps is found, which indicates that a considerable degree of
uncertainty is present in the carbon market.
Given these results, policy implications are derived by assessing the e®ect
of uncertainty from the real option perspective. This approach establishes
an inverse relationship between uncertainty and investment, especially in the
case of irreversible and industry-speci¯c investments. According to Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) a ¯rm chooses to delay the expenditure with the prospect of
gaining information on the pro¯tability of a project. This insight can be ap-
plied to the speci¯c situation of ¯rms within the European Emission Trading
Scheme (ETS). Here, ¯rms face a fundamental decision - either they acquire
su±cient certi¯cates in the market or they reduce the carbon emissions they
2generate by investing in abatement technologies. Cleaner and more e±cient
production process save costs of future certi¯cates and energy, but also rep-
resent irreversible expenditures. As the peculiar behavior of certi¯cate prices
introduces additional uncertainty, the real option literature predicts a delay
of ¯rm's abatement investment.
2 Method
Chan and Maheu's (2002) method extends traditional GARCH models by a
conditional-jump component. This section brie°y outlines this method.1
Consider the following model:









with zt » NID(0;1). ht is assumed to follow a GARCH(p,q) process [Boller-
slev, 1986]:









The conditional jump size Xt;k, given the history of observations ©t¡1 =
fyt¡1;:::;y1g, is assumed to be normally distributed with mean µt and vari-
ance ±2
t: Xt;k » N(µt;±2
t). The number of jumps nt that arrive between t¡1
and t follows a Poisson distribution with ¸t > 0:







where ¸t measures the jump-intensity. Two variants of the model are consid-
ered here: a constant jump-intensity model with ¸t = ¸, µt = µ, and ±2
t = ±2;
and a time-varying jump-intensity model. For the case of the latter, ¸t is
assumed to follow the auto-regressive process







1For a more thorough discussion of the method the reader is referred to Chan and
Maheu's (2002) original paper.
3This model class and bivariate extensions of which have been successfully
applied to stock market returns [Chan and Maheu, 2002], exchange rates
[Chan, 2003; Chan, 2004], and copper prices [Chan and Young, 2006]. The
following section presents the results obtained from applying this method to
emission allowance prices.
3 Results
The model is estimated for daily emission allowance spot prices (24/06/2005
- 29/12/2006) as well as 2008 future prices (22/04/2005 - 15/12/2008). Thus,
both Phase I and early stage Phase II data is considered. First log-di®erences
of the data is used and a constant as well as two lags of the spot price and
one lag for the future price are included.2 Table 1 provides the estimation
results. It is evident that for both price series all jump parameters are highly
signi¯cant. What is more, Figure 1 vividly illustrates that the Chan and Ma-
heu (2002) method is very well able to capture the emission allowance price's
peculiar behavior. Displayed are the price together with the time-varying
jump-intensities. It is evident that periods with larger price movements are
accompanied by larger jump-intensities. In particular, the severe drop in the
prices end of April 2006 is well captured by the model as indicated by the
peak in the jump intensity (lower left panel). Prices dropped, when national
emission reports con¯rmed a signi¯cant oversupply with certi¯cates of most
European installations. The estimates for the EUA future, furthermore, show
that the jump behavior is also present in early Phase II stages, epitomized
by the two jump intensity peaks January 2008 and October 2008. Possible
sources for these sudden price movements that have been discussed in the
literature include NAP announcements and relative changes in trading vol-
umes [Sanin and Violante, 2009] as well as energy prices and unanticipated
weather events [Alberola et al., 2008]. It is worth noting that the EUA price
2Spot price data from the environmental exchange Bluenext is used and available at
www.bluenext.eu. Due to larger trading volumes, the data is preferred to spot price
data from the EEX in Leipzig. The spot price sample end has been chosen because of the
subsequent decrease of the price series to 0, which can hardly be classi¯ed as representative
price behavior. The future price data is obtained from the European Climate Exchange
(www.ecx.eu).
4Table 1: Constant and Time-Varying Jump-Intensity Models
Spot price Future price
Parameter Constant ARJI Constant ARJI
1.6E-03 0.002 2.6E-03 2.8E-03 ¹
(0.1170) (0.0331) (0.0028) (0.0003)
0.1652 0.1570 0.1049 0.0861 Á1 (0.0063) (0.0109) (0.0044) (0.0273)
-0.0872 -0.1141 Á2 (0.0960) (0.0340)
- -
5.8E-06 8.9E-07 1.8E-05 1.6E-05 !
(0.4106) (0.2852) (0.0200) (0.0229)
0.1453 0.0909 0.1086 0.0610 ®
(0.0043) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0237)
0.7444 0.7937 0.7902 0.8294 ¯
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.0419 0.0324 0.0334 0.0280 ±
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
-0.0170 -0.0136 -9.7E-03 -6.7E-03 µ
(0.0125) (0.0043) (0.0468) (0.0355)
0.2347 0.1725 0.2300 0.1113 ¸
(0.0011) (0.0139) (0.0118) (0.0968)








Note: p-values in parentheses.
jump behavior is more pronounced than that of Dow Jones returns in Chan
and Maheu's (2002) original application. While the height of peaks is similar
in both studies, the frequency of peaks as well as the average jump intensity
is higher for the EUA prices.
In a nutshell, strong evidence of conditional jumps is found in emission al-
lowance prices, which indicates that the prices are subject to larger unex-
pected price movements. This, however, suggests that a considerable degree
of uncertainty is present in the carbon market. The following section dis-
cusses the in°uence of this apparent uncertainty on the abatement strategy
of complying ¯rms.
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4 Discussion
The real option literature is most relevant as it investigates the e®ect of un-
certainty on economic decision making [Dixit and Pindyck, 1994].
Concerning the decision making on the ¯rm level, Bernanke (1983) as well
as McDonald and Siegel (1986) point out that irreversible investments are
more likely to be postponed if uncertainty on future returns arises. Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) emphasize that in this situation the option to wait for
additional information becomes more attractive. Uncertainty, for example
arising from prices [Pindyck, 1981] or from future demand [Pindyck, 1993]
makes future pro¯ts hard to calculate. Therefore, theory predicts a nega-
6tive relationship between the waiting option and an irreversible investment
[Mohn and Misund, 2009].3
The real options idea has not only been applied to investment decisions, but
also plays an important role in environmental and resource economics. Ar-
row and Fisher (1974), Fisher (2000) and Pindyck (2000) model uncertainty
originating from complex environmental interdependencies and discuss im-
plications for policy decisions. As impact and costs of environmental degra-
dation are hard to assess, the timing of environmental policies and related
expenditures becomes more di±cult. More recently Dangl and Wirl (2007)
investigate how optimal intertemporal emission policies are a®ected by un-
certainty about the temperature curve.
Particularly relevant are papers that apply the real option view to investment
decisions under emission trading schemes. Herbelot (1994) and Isney (2003)
both analyze the decision to retro¯t a power plant under the Clean Air Act
in the US, which bans SO2 emissions. What is more, some recent papers
employ the real options approach to the ETS. In this speci¯c context, ¯rms
face the decision whether to buy su±cient certi¯cates or to reduce the carbon
emissions they generate by investing in abatement technologies. Yang et al.
(2008) as well as Tuthill (2008) frame a model on abatement decisions under
the ETS. They ¯nd that the e®ect of regulatory uncertainty is particularly
important within the European framework. By causing jumps in certi¯cate
prices, regulatory decisions add disturbance to the carbon market and con-
sequently lead to a delay of investments.
Drawing from this theoretical literature, the evidence of jump behavior pose
an additional source of uncertainty in investment decisions, as they make
calculation of compliance costs more di±cult. Facing this uncertainty, ¯rms
become more hesitant about investments and emission-reducing retro¯ts will
be realized later in time.
3This conclusion has not been undisputed. Hartman (1972), later extended by Abel
(1983) analyze a setting where uncertainty will have an positive or at least ambiguous e®ect
on investment. As a result, this controversy has been investigated in a large number of
empirical studies. The results have been surveyed by Carruth (2000). Overall, a negative
relationship between uncertainty and investment is con¯rmed that probably dominates
positive e®ects.
7Evidence of jumps is found throughout the estimation period, whereas the
intensity of jumps changes substantially over time. As jumps can be found
throughout the sample, a considerable degree of uncertainty seems to be in-
herent in the system. Amongst the in°uencing factors are fossil fuel prices,
weather events and the market power of large ¯rms. Moreover, some extraor-
dinarily high jumps can be ascribed to decisions on provision and allocation
of certi¯cates. The event in April 2006 exempli¯es how uncertainty is intro-
duced by the regulatory framework. Such in°uence of regulatory decisions
on price behavior has been presumed by Tuthill (2008) as well as Sanin and
Violante (2009). Certainly, Phase I was created as test period, introducing
regulators as well as ¯rms to the newly installed mechanism. However, the
delayed submission of National Allocation Plans for Phase II again created
insecurity about the ¯nal issuance of all Member States. Further possible
sources of disturbance result from the national limits on CDM and JI credits
which can be used for compliance within the ETS. The impact of increased
auctioning, ¯nally, remains equally unclear. Hence, if regulators do not learn
from the Phase I events and improve the system, price uncertainty will re-
main problematic in the future.
This paper aims to evaluate emission trading and its performance with re-
gard to the reduction of carbon emissions. Evidence is found that investments
might be postponed under the ETS. According to Sinn (2008), later abate-
ment of carbon emissions leads to higher atmospheric carbon concentration
which accelerates climate change. What is more, the sensitivity of EUA
prices to various sources suggests that they do not re°ect marginal abate-
ment costs. Therefore, concerns recently expressed by Hintermann (2009) are
reinforced. These e®ects are often neglected when assessing emission trading
against other environmental policies.
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